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HARRINGTON V. RICHTER:
AEDPA DEFERENCE AND THE
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
KARA DUFFLE*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court will interpret the
2
AEDPA in light of two great bulwarks against injustice for criminal
defendants: habeas corpus and the constitutional right to effective
3
assistance of counsel. The Court will determine what degree of
deference, under the AEDPA, federal courts must grant to state-court
summary dispositions in considering petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. The Court then will proceed to the merits of Respondent
Joshua Richter’s habeas claim to determine whether the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly, and impermissibly, enlarged the Sixth Amendment right to
4
effective assistance of counsel.
II. FACTS
On December 19, 1994, Richter and his co-defendant Christian
5
Branscombe were visiting Joshua “Gunner” Johnson at his home. At
around 2:30 AM, after smoking marijuana and cleaning Branscombe’s
6
gun, Richter and Branscombe left. Patrick Klein, a friend of

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Lisa
Griffin and Christopher Ford for their invaluable help in writing this commentary.
1. Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2010).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Id.
5. Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (09-587).
6. Id.
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Johnson’s, decided to spend the night. At trial, the State of California
and Richter presented “dramatically different accounts” of the events
8
that followed.
The State, according to testimony by Johnson, argued that
Johnson awoke to find Richter and Branscombe in his bedroom
9
attempting to steal his gun safe. Branscombe then shot Johnson twice,
10
wounding him. A short time later, Johnson heard shots in the living
11
room and found Klein bleeding on the couch. His gun safe, .380
12
caliber M-12, and $6,000 in cash were missing.
In contrast, Richter said that upon returning to Johnson’s to drop
off some belongings, he waited in the truck while Klein let
13
Branscombe into the house. Shortly thereafter, Richter heard
gunshots and entered the house to find Klein lying in a pool of blood
in the doorway, Johnson wounded, and Branscombe “totally freaked
14
15
out.” Branscombe was shouting, “[t]hey tried to kill me.” Richter
argued that Johnson fired first, accidentally hitting Klein, and that
16
Branscombe responded in self-defense.
At some point after the shootings, Johnson called 911 and the
17
police arrived to find him “hysterical” and bloody. Klein was “near
18
death” on top of a sleeping bag on the couch. Police uncovered two
casings in the bedroom, a large pool of blood in the doorway, more
19
casings near the couch, and blood throughout the house. Police
deemed this evidence consistent with Johnson’s story and did not
20
conduct an in-depth forensic investigation.
After the trial had already started, the State conducted forensic
21
tests and called two forensic experts to testify. A blood spatter expert
stated that it was unlikely that Klein had been killed in the doorway

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947–48.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 948–49.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 950.
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22

and later carried to the couch. A serologist tested blood from spatter
above the doorway and testified that it did not match Klein’s blood
23
24
type. The defense did not call or consult with forensic experts.
The jury convicted Richter and Branscombe of murder, attempted
25
murder, robbery, and burglary. The California Court of Appeal
affirmed the convictions and the California Supreme Court denied
26
petitions for review and for habeas relief. The District Court for the
Eastern District of California then rejected Richter’s federal habeas
27
petition, a decision affirmed by a panel of the Ninth Circuit. Sitting
en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial
28
and remanded with directions to grant Richter’s habeas petition.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In his petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the California
Supreme Court and the federal district court, Richter argued that he
had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
29
counsel. When, as here, a district court considers a habeas petition
that originated in state court, it must address the additional
30
obligations set forth in section 2254(d) of the AEDPA.
A. The AEDPA
If a prisoner believes his conviction was obtained in violation of
the United States Constitution, the exhaustion of state appeals “need
31
not be the end of the road.” Through the writ of habeas corpus, he
32
may petition for relief in federal court. The goal of habeas corpus is
33
to ensure the “fundamental fairness of the state adjudication.” As
34
Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in Frank v. Mangum, “[h]abeas
corpus . . . cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 947.
26. Id. at 950.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 969.
29. Id. at 952.
30. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010).
31. Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t Get There From Here?”: Ineffective Assistance Claims
in Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 545, 550 (2009).
32. Id.
33. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000).
34. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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structure . . . and although every form may have been preserved,
opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty
35
shell.”
36
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen broadened the
scope of habeas review by mandating that state-court decisions
rejecting the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners receive de
37
novo review. In 1996, however, Congress passed the AEDPA, raising
the level of deference accorded to state-court decisions and insulating
38
them from federal scrutiny. The relevant statutory provision, section
2254(d), provides that an application for habeas “shall not be
granted” for any claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” unless the
state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law” or was “based on an
39
unreasonable determination of the facts.”
The AEDPA was enacted to address the interests “of comity,
40
finality, and federalism.” Specifically, “Congress wished to curb
delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas, and to give effect to
41
state convictions to the extent possible under law.” By making it
more difficult for a federal court to grant a habeas petition that
originated in a state court, the AEDPA altered the relationship of
42
those courts. De novo review, as required under Brown, implies a
level of skepticism about whether state courts can adequately decide
43
federal constitutional issues, whereas the AEDPA adopts the
44
presumption that “state courts know and follow the law.”
45
When federal courts consider unreasoned state-court decisions,
the relationship between federal and state courts is further

35. Id.
36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37. Id. at 546.
38. Ezra Spilke, Adjudicated on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires State Courts to
Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 995, 1003 (2006).
39. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010).
40. E.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003)).
41. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000).
42. See O’Meara, supra note 31, at 555 (“The strength of the writ of habeas corpus depends
in large part on how easily petitioners can get into court. AEDPA seemed to make access to
federal court difficult.”).
43. Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer To That Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets
the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (2002).
44. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
45. An “unreasoned” decision would be a summary disposition that provides no signal or
explanation as to how it was decided.
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complicated by the statutory requirement that the claim be
46
47
“adjudicated on the merits.” In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the Supreme
Court authorized federal courts to “look through” the unexplained
order to an earlier reasoned state-court judgment, based on the
48
presumption that the decisions “rest upon the same ground.” The
Court stated that “[t]he essence of unexplained orders is that they say
nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect . . .
49
most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.”
The Court has not yet answered the question of what federal courts
are to do when no such earlier reasoned judgment exists.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Strickland v. Washington
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
50
51
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” In Strickland v. Washington,
the Court fleshed out this right and laid down the current standard for
52
constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court
stated that “[t]he right to counsel plays a crucial role in the
53
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment” and that the
“benchmark . . . must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of [that] process that the trial cannot be relied
54
on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland requires that a criminal defendant meet a two-pronged
55
test. The defendant must prove that (1) counsel’s performance was
56
deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This standard, which is no more specific than “reasonableness under
57
prevailing professional norms,” was meant to be “highly deferential”
58
to defense counsel. To meet the performance prong, counsel’s
failures must be so severe that he was not “functioning as the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010).
Ylst v, Nunnemaker, 537 U.S. 797 (1991).
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
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‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” To
meet the prejudice prong, the defendant must have been deprived of
60
a fair trial. The test accounts for the fact that there are “countless
61
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.”
Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases—
62
63
64
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, and Rompilla v. Beard —that
enlarged the scope of the right to effective counsel by requiring “far
65
more robust investigation.” In each of these capital cases, the
Supreme Court found that the defendant’s counsel had provided
ineffective assistance by failing to reasonably investigate possible
avenues of defense. In Williams, the Court invalidated the conviction
because counsel “failed to discover a treasure trove of mitigating
66
evidence” that might have “influenced the jury’s appraisal of [the
67
defendant’s] moral culpability.” In Wiggins, counsel knew of the
defendant’s troubling history yet failed to follow up on leads
68
regarding that history. The Court found that this was not a strategic
decision because without adequate investigation “counsel w[as] not in
69
a position to make a reasonable strategic choice . . . .” Finally, in
Rompilla, counsel failed to investigate an aggravating factor on which
70
the prosecution intended to rely. Though noting that counsel need
not “look[] for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer has reason to
71
doubt there is any needle there,” the Court nevertheless expanded
59. Id. at 687.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 689.
62. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
63. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
64. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
65. O’Meara, supra note 31, at 575.
66. Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 527
(2009).
67. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. In Williams, the defendant was “borderline mentally
retarded” and had suffered severe mistreatment, abuse, and neglect as a child, all of which his
attorney had failed to investigate and present. Furthermore, the same experts that testified on
the State’s behalf later admitted that in a controlled environment the defendant would not pose
a risk of future harm. Id. at 370–71.
68. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. In Wiggins, the defendant had a traumatic childhood that
included physical and sexual abuse, being left at home for days with no food, and being raped
and molested while in foster care, all of which counsel failed to reasonably investigate and
present at trial. Id. at 517.
69. Id. at 536.
70. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385–86. In Rompilla, counsel failed to thoroughly investigate
signs of the defendant’s troubled childhood, mental illness, and alcoholism. Counsel failed to
look at the defendant’s prior conviction file, which the State had and planned to use against the
defendant. Id. at 390.
71. Id. at 389.
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Strickland by requiring defense attorneys to look at the entire case
72
and “all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits . . . .”
In 2009, however, the Supreme Court halted the growth of the
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine with its rejection of the
73
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Knowles v. Mirzayance. In Knowles, the
Ninth Circuit held counsel’s performance deficient because he failed
74
to present an insanity defense when he had “nothing to lose.” The
Supreme Court refused to adopt the “nothing to lose” standard and
noted that “this Court has never required defense counsel to pursue
every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic
75
chance of success.” Even without the “doubly deferential” review
76
under the AEDPA, the Court stated, the claim would still fail.
IV. HOLDING
In Richter v. Hickman, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
courts’ decision and held that Richter’s counsel violated the right to
77
78
effective assistance of counsel. The court began by quoting Sun Tzu
79
on the virtues of preparedness, condemning Richter’s counsel for
80
behaving most unlike a Boy Scout. Judge Reinhardt, writing for the
majority, stated that counsel’s lack of preparation resulted in
ineffective representation and, as a result, the trial court unreasonably
81
applied Strickland. The majority stated that counsel behaved
unreasonably in failing to investigate the availability of forensic
evidence and to consult forensic experts regarding a central issue in

72. Id. at 387.
73. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1413 (2009) (holding that “Mirzayance failed
to establish that his counsel’s performance was ineffective . . . “).
74. Id. at 1417.
75. Id. at 1420.
76. Id.
77. Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (09-587).
78. Sun Tzu is a famous Chinese philosopher who is best known for writing THE ART OF
WAR.
79. Richter, 578 F.3d at 946 (“To . . . not prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared
beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues.” (quoting SUN TZU, THE ART OF
WAR 83 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University Press 1963))).
80. See Boy Scout Motto, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (Aug. 5, 2007), http://usscouts.org/
advance/boyscout/bsmotto.asp (“Be Prepared.”).
81. The majority proceeded to an analysis of the merits and dismissed the issue of AEDPA
deference, noting that it would grant the writ under either a de novo or objective
unreasonableness standard of review. Richter, 578 F.3d. at 951 n.5.
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the case. The holding revolves around the understanding that
83
adequate investigation is at “the heart of an effective defense.”
Under Strickland’s first prong, the performance prong, the
majority stated that counsel failed in his duty to Richter in three ways.
Counsel failed to (1) investigate prior to choosing a trial strategy; (2)
investigate available corroborating forensic evidence during trial
preparation; and (3) consult experts during the trial to counter the
84
State’s sudden introduction of damaging expert testimony. The
majority reasoned that although state courts have a generous amount
of latitude in applying the Sixth Amendment’s protections, “[w]e do
not . . . afford [them] a blank check to determine, at their whim,
85
whether an attorney’s conduct was reasonable or unreasonable.”
Because counsel provided no reasoned explanation for his failure
to investigate, the majority rejected the argument that counsel’s
86
decision was strategic. It distinguished the case from Knowles, where
counsel was well-informed, and analogized it to Wiggins, in which the
Court held that counsel could not be well-informed without
87
adequately investigating his client’s history. The majority also
rejected the argument that counsel’s failure was reasonable because
he was “hamstrung by the element of surprise,” stating that he should
have investigated before the trial began and not only in response to
88
the State’s use of experts. The majority cautioned, however, that this
holding would not require counsel to seek expert advice on every
89
90
conceivable issue or at “every stage of the proceedings,” but only
where the issue is of central importance.
Continuing to Strickland’s prejudice prong, the majority held that
Richter’s counsel prejudiced his client by failing to introduce blood91
spatter evidence. A subsequent investigation by Richter’s new
counsel revealed expert testimony from a reliable source that directly
92
contradicted the State’s version of events. The testimony would
seriously reduce Richter’s culpability and would discredit Johnson,
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 953–54.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 952.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 954 n.7.
Id. at 954 n.8 (quoting id. at 970 (Bybee, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 966.
Id. at 963.
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the State’s key witness. Furthermore, the majority noted that
counsel’s failures did not go unnoticed by the State, who mocked the
94
defense counsel during closing arguments.
On February 22, 2010, the Supreme Court granted the State’s
petition for writ of certiorari regarding whether the Ninth Circuit
“impermissibly enlarged” the Sixth Amendment right to effective
95
counsel. In addition, the Court directed the parties to brief the
question: “Does AEDPA deference apply to a state court’s summary
disposition of a claim, including a claim under Strickland v.
96
Washington?”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. The Scope of the AEDPA’s “Adjudicated on the Merits” Clause
The State argued that AEDPA deference applies to the
unreasoned summary disposition because of state court practices, the
plain language of section 2254(d), and the need to protect the
97
interests of federalism and efficiency. First, the State argued that
under well-established state-court precedent an unexplained decision
98
rejecting a habeas petition is a ruling on the merits. The State relied
99
on In re Robbins, stating that if a California court invokes a
procedural bar as a basis for denying relief, it will cite to that
100
procedural default in its order. The California Supreme Court did
not do so here.
Second, the State argued that the plain language of the statute
does not require an explained ruling, noting that Congress
presumably knew that unexplained decisions are common in state and
101
federal habeas litigation.
Under section 2254(d), the State
93. Id.
94. Id. at 962 (“I am not going to worry about Jill Spriggs . . . because, hey, her seven years
as a biochemist and a criminalist, and the fact that she went to college to learn this stuff doesn’t
mean anything, because I am a lawyer . . . . I am not going to pay and bring in an expert to show
you . . . . I am a lawyer. I can do it.”) (emphasis omitted).
95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Harrington v. Richter, No. 09-587 (U.S. Nov. 9,
2009).
96. Harrington v. Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506, 1507 (U.S. Feb. 22. 2010) (No. 09-587).
97. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 17, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. May 10, 2010).
98. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits at 4–5, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. Aug. 23,
2010).
99. In re Robbins, 959 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1998).
100. Id. at 340.
101. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 24–27.
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articulated that it is the ultimate decision that matters and not the
102
reasoning. To suggest that AEDPA deference requires a reasoned
decision would “necessarily require adding language to an
unambiguous statute—no less one that is part of a detailed and
103
comprehensive statutory scheme.”
Finally, the State argued that the purposes for which the AEDPA
had been enacted would be frustrated if summary dispositions do not
104
warrant AEDPA deference. Nearly 20,000 criminal habeas petitions
105
are decided in California each year, and “this Court has recognized
that it has ‘no power to tell state courts how they must write their
106
opinions.’” To deny deference when, for efficiency reasons or
otherwise, a state-court decision is unexplained would “imply,
unjustifiably, that these adjudications are not well-reasoned and are
107
the product of a dereliction of judicial duty.”
Richter, in contrast, argued that the summary disposition should
not trigger AEDPA deference because of California’s “peculiar”
scheme of summary denials, the necessity of adjudicating on both
Strickland prongs, and the fact that sections 2254(d)(1) and (2)
108
require some analysis of the state court’s reasoning. First, California
109
has four distinct types of summary dispositions. State courts may
110
deny a petition by stating that it is “on the merits” ; by citing a
111
procedural default ; and by relying on a combination of merits-based
112
and procedural reasons. Courts can also, as here, issue a “silent
denial” when “a majority of the state court has not reached a
consensus as to whether the reasons for denying a petition are merits113
based or procedural.” In light of this scheme, Richter argued that
had the California Supreme Court intended the order to be an
adjudication on the merits it could have stated that intention, as it had
114
with at least five other cases that were reviewed on the same day.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 739 (1991)).
Id. at 30.
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, Harrington, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 9, 2010).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 26.
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Richter also noted that the State, in a brief for another case, adopted
this very argument: “[D]etermining what this particular summary
order meant was impossible because the seven members of the state
court may ‘not themselves have agreed upon its rationale, so that the
115
basis of the decision is not merely undiscoverable but nonexistent.’”
Second, Richter argued that in cases raising Strickland claims,
AEDPA deference to unreasoned decisions is an “end run around the
state’s burden” to prove that both prongs were adjudicated on the
116
merits. Richter asserted that, “[r]equiring the state to prove what
has actually been adjudicated on the merits is a minimal burden for
the state to meet in order to get the considerable benefits of section
117
2254(d).”
Finally, Richter argued that sections 2254(d)(1) and (2), which
provide mechanisms to prove that the AEDPA does not bar habeas
118
119
relief, require some analysis of the state court’s reasoning. The
state court’s decision must be reached “through application of the
120
correct law to appropriately determined facts.” As Amicus Curiae
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argued, “[w]here
the state court’s decision fails to provide the information necessary . . .
the process Congress designed for determining the availability of
121
deferential treatment cannot be carried out.” Richter claimed that if
unreasoned decisions are granted AEDPA deference, state courts will
have a perverse incentive to “say nothing at all” and thereby avoid
122
scrutiny.
B. What is “Reasonable” under Strickland v. Washington?
Regarding the merits of Richter’s claim, the State argued that the
Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that the state court was unreasonable
and that it impermissibly enlarged the Sixth Amendment right to
123
effective counsel. The State characterized the Ninth Circuit’s

115. Id. at 28 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 24, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (No.
04-721)).
116. Id. at 13–14.
117. Id. at 39.
118. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2010).
119. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 40.
120. Amicus Curiae Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support
of Respondent at 3, Harrington v. Richter, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 14, 2010).
121. Id. at 2.
122. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 14.
123. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 52.
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holding as one that requires counsel to consult with or produce expert
testimony “regardless [of] whether counsel could reasonably conclude
124
that such investigation would not be promising . . . .” The State
reasoned that although Sun Tzu’s exhortation on preparedness is
worthy of aspiration, it is not the law and does not take into account
125
the demands and constraints of our judicial system. Here, Richter’s
counsel faced a “daunting” job and reasonably executed his chosen
126
strategy. As the State articulated, “it was reasonable under
127
Strickland. It need not have satisfied Sun Tzu.”
The State claimed that counsel’s actions were not deficient
enough to overcome the “strong presumption” of reasonableness
128
under the first Strickland prong. The State argued that the choice of
strategy—attacking the credibility of the drug-dealing survivor and
exploiting the deficiencies in the police investigation—ought to be
129
protected as a product of reasonable professional judgment.
130
Counsel faced overwhelming evidence of Richter’s guilt, and to
limit the investigation of the blood evidence was reasonable when it
131
could have been harmful. Furthermore, though counsel did not call
expert witnesses to rebut the State’s mid-trial presentation of expert
132
testimony, he did “cross-examin[e] them to good effect.” Counsel
originally, and reasonably, believed the case to be a credibility contest,
and later was hampered by denied motions for continuance following
133
the State’s introduction of expert testimony.
Under the second Strickland prong, the State argued that the issue
134
of the blood pool was not “crucial to the defense case.” In addition,
Richter’s experts, who did not address the most important forensic
evidence, would not be able to overcome the “compelling physical
135
evidence that tied Richter directly to the crimes[.]” Thus, even if
136
counsel had been deficient, it would not have affected the outcome.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 39.
Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 98, at 19.
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 52.
Id. at 39
Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 98, at 17.
Id. at 19.
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 39.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51.
Id at 47.
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Richter, in contrast, argued that counsel’s performance was so
deficient as to be unreasonable, using much of the same reasoning as
137
the Ninth Circuit. Richter claimed, consistent with Wiggins, that the
Sixth Amendment protects a defendant from counsel who fails to
investigate the theory of the defense that he selected, called his client
138
to support, and relied on in both opening and closing. Richter
rejected the idea that relying on cross-examination was a reasonable
alternative to presenting affirmative evidence because counsel’s
failure to consult with experts left him uninformed and unprepared
139
for questioning.
Richter claimed that these failures were prejudicial because in a
credibility contest any defense attorney “worth his salt” would
investigate available affirmative evidence to bolster the witness’
140
credibility on a central issue in the case. Presenting expert testimony
to directly contradict the State could have persuaded the jury to
141
decide that issue in the Richter’s favor.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION
Regarding the initial question of AEDPA deference, the Court
likely will decide that summary dispositions are “adjudicated on the
merits” when it is clear that the decision was made on substantive,
rather than procedural, grounds. This would require no more than a
brief signal to federal courts rather than a full opinion or analysis. The
Court likely will not want to undermine the common practices of
state courts to summarily deny habeas petitions, particularly given the
142
interests of efficiency and simplicity. Thus the Court will adopt the
137. See supra Part IV (arguing that counsel was unreasonable in failing to adequately
investigate and prepare for a strategy he selected and noting the importance of the new
evidence, particularly in regard to its role in corroborating Richter’s testimony).
138. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 48.
139. Id. at 52.
140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Harrington, No. 09-587 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010).
141. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 108, at 50–60.
142. See Brief of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–7, Harrington v. Richter, 09-587 (U.S.
May 17, 2010) (providing statistics for the widespread use of summary dispositions in state
courts and illustrating that it is a common practice in habeas litigation to deny a petition
summarily and without reason); but see Brief of Law Professors and Legal Scholars as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1–2, Harrington, 09-587 (U.S. Jul. 16, 2010) (arguing that
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view, held by several circuits, that the “adjudicated on the merits”
143
clause is focused on the ultimate decision and not on the process. As
the Second Circuit stated, “we are determining the reasonableness of
144
the state courts’ ‘decision,’ . . . not grading their papers.” This
145
interpretation is in line with the principles of federalism and judicial
146
administrability, for which the AEDPA was enacted because it will
promote the efficient disposition of habeas petitions without the
threat of relitigation in federal court.
The Court likely will not extend AEDPA deference, however, to
instances where the state court has been silent. During oral
arguments, the justices struggled to determine what exactly the
California Supreme Court’s “silent denial” was meant to
147
communicate. As the Court said in Ylst, “[t]he problem we face
arises . . . because many formulary orders are not meant to convey
anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is
148
therefore both difficult and artificial.” Similarly, in Fortini v.
149
150
Murphy, the First Circuit noted the “frustrating impossibility” that
surrounds silent denials in habeas litigation: “AEDPA imposes a
requirement of deference to state-court decisions, but we can hardly
defer to the state court on an issue that the state court did not
151
address.” By holding that AEDPA deference is not warranted for
“silent” denials that are issued without indication of a basis for the
decision, the Court likely will establish a clear rule that eliminates

although summary dispositions are common, many states require some form of explanation or
reasoning).
143. See Maura Caffrey, Untying the Knot: A Solution for Confusion in Federal Habeas
Review of Pennsylvania State Court Capital Convictions, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 985, 992 (2009)
(citing several circuits that support the proposition that AEDPA deference does not require
discussion).
144. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
145. See Dennis M. Cariello, Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting for the Values
of Federalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493 (1999) (explaining the core principles of federalism
and defining federalism as a form of cooperative government that seeks to allocate
responsibility to either the state or national government depending on which is better suited to
the task).
146. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 97, at 28.
147. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 55 (“It’s still not clear to me how
to distinguish that, between denied, deny—do we say, when there’s a one-line order, as in this
case, where it says simply ‘deny,’ it is presumptively on the merits? I mean, how . . . do we
interpret that?” (Kennedy, J.)).
148. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991).
149. Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001).
150. Wilner, supra note 43, at 1462.
151. Fortini, 257 F.3d at 47.
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much of the confusion and inaccuracy with which courts have applied
the AEDPA.
Although such a holding would help to simplify the application of
the AEDPA by federal courts, a preferable, though extremely
unlikely, outcome would be for the Court to decide that AEDPA
deference is triggered only if a state-court decision contains explicit
reasoning. Such a holding would best protect the fundamental habeas
right, while providing a clear directive to state courts that the
152
disposition of such important cases cannot be merely formulaic. In
Williams, the Court clarified sections 2254(d)(1) and (2) and
suggested that some analysis of the state court’s reasoning is needed
153
to apply the statute. Requiring state courts to provide such
reasoning would advance the judiciary’s interest in accuracy and
administrability when reviewing state-court habeas cases because
federal courts would not have to speculate about what facts were
relied on or which law was applied. Although federal courts would
still defer to state-court decisions, they would not have to do so
154
blindly. Habeas corpus is often the final means of relief for a state
prisoner and deserves reasoned, thoughtful review from at least one
155
court.
Because the Court will probably find that the denial here was
silent and does not warrant AEDPA deference, Richter’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will be reviewed de novo. Even so, the
Court will likely reiterate the importance of the duty to investigate as
found in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, but will distinguish this case
and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Here, the Court will likely
152. See Spilke, supra note 38, at 1015 (describing the problems inherent in deferring to
silent state-court opinions in the habeas context: “Since nothing stops state courts from acting
arbitrarily, yet silently, the requirement that the claim be adjudicated on the merits before its
dismissal is granted AEDPA deference is rendered meaningless.”).
153. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (“First, a state-court decision involves
an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the
particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable
application of this Court’s precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal
principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.”).
154. See Robert D. Sloane, AEDPA’s “Adjudication on the Merits” Requirement: Collateral
Review, Federalism, and Comity, 28 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 615, 659 (2004) (“It makes little sense to
circumscribe a federal court’s ability to analyze a federal question based on the absence of a
state court analysis.” (emphasis omitted)).
155. This is not to suggest that state courts would need to write long opinions for each case,
but that they would be required at a minimum to signal to the petitioner and to federal courts
under what law and applying which facts the petition was rejected.
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find that, on these facts, the Ninth Circuit has pushed the boundary
156
too far.
During oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor said “if you are in an
area . . . where you have no expertise and your case depends on a
technical issue, it behooves you to at least talk to an expert to find out
157
if you are on the right track.” Sotomayor’s reasoning, however, is
unlikely to persuade the Court for a least two reasons. First, the three
cases that expanded counsel’s duty to investigate were all capital
158
cases. Richter faces life in prison, and while that is a significant
punishment, the Court likely will distinguish Richter from a
159
defendant facing death row. In non-capital cases, it is often
extremely difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective
160
assistance of counsel. In fact, Strickland has been referred to as the
“foggy mirror” test: “If you place a mirror in front of defense counsel
161
and it fogs, counsel is in fact effective.” Here, counsel prepared and
carried out a strategy, albeit not a winning strategy, that likely will be
protected against the claim of ineffective assistance. Furthermore,
even if Richter were to win on the performance prong, the Court is
unlikely to find prejudice given the weight of evidence against him.
Second, the Court will strongly consider the administrability of
stretching the Strickland standard to these facts. The Court will be
wary of any rule that seems to require consultation with or
presentation of experts, or that requires affirmative evidence in the
place of cross-examination. The Court has been reluctant to impose

156. Notably, of the circuit courts, the Ninth Circuit has the highest rate of reversal by the
Supreme Court in the past thirty years. Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the
Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 357 (2006).
157. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 17.
158. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
159. See Smith, supra note 66, at 535–36 (explaining the expansion of the ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine from 2000–2005 as an effort to combat the “politics of death”—
such as the underfunding of indigent capital defense—and the effects they have on the
administration of the death penalty).
160. See Marcus Proctor Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 13
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 330 (2002) (citing various criticisms of the Strickland test);
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (“Ten years after the articulation of that
standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to
protect a defendant’s right to be represented by something more than ‘a person who happens to
be a lawyer.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)).
161. RANDALL COYNE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, TEACHER’S
MANUAL 210 (3d ed. 2006).
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specific rules, instead favoring the independent choices of counsel.
Effective assistance of counsel is a right guaranteed by the
Constitution and stands as a safeguard against injustice, but it must
work within the constraints and demands of our criminal justice
system. In Harrington v. Richter, the Court likely will attend to this
tension by declining to impose strenuous burdens on defense counsel.

162. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (rejecting a rule that failing to file an
appeal, absent contrary instructions from the client, is per se deficient, favoring a consideration
of all circumstances); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (explaining that choosing how
to structure closing arguments is a “core exercise” of counsel’s discretion and that there is a
strong presumption that those choices are tactical).

